We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004) , the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition if informed investors were to partner with non-incumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.
Private partnerships, such as hedge funds, have been shown to exhibit persistence in the abnormal performance they generate for investors (see Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov 2010) . 1 Mutual funds, in contrast, show little performance persistence. The persistence that is evident in mutual fund performance is concentrated in the worst performing funds (see Carhart 1997, Berk and Tonks 2008) , where it appears to be largely attributable to inattention by investors in those funds.
Such an explanation for persistence in the performance of hedge funds is inconsistent with the nature of the investor base, which consists of institutions and wealthy, relatively sophisticated, individuals. It is also at odds with the facts. Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) document that performance is persistent for hedge funds that perform well, and are thus able to attract new flows.
An explanation for the sensitivity of mutual-fund flows to performance, despite the lack of persistence in performance, is offered by Berk and Green (2004) . In that model, investors learn about heterogeneous ability through past returns, but there are decreasing returns to scale in deploying those abilities. In light of this explanation for the behavior of mutual funds, hedge fund partnerships present a puzzle. If flows respond to learning about hedge fund returns, as they appear to do, why do managers not expand the fund or raise their fees to capture the rents going forward?
In this paper, we rationalize performance persistence for hedge funds. Our model is based on evident differences in the institutional setting between mutual funds and hedge funds. We show that persistence can be explained through a need for secrecy. The source of superior returns may not be entirely skills or abilities intrinsic to the manager. Superior returns may also be attributable to strategies or techniques that could be expropriated and exploited by others if they were informed about them. This would explain the use of the limited partnership organizational form for certain types of investment funds.
Hedge funds have a common feature, despite the wide range of investment activities they engage in. They are private. They are organized as limited partnerships and solicit funds from large, "qualified" investors. This frees them from the elaborate disclosure requirements and oversight 1 See also Fung, et al (2008) who document performance persistence in funds of hedge funds. mutual funds and publicly traded corporations are subject to. The common choice of organizational form is an endogenous response. A concern that disclosure and oversight, and the associated leakage of information, would erode their ability to generate rents is a natural place to look for a common, primitive determinant of this choice. Our model could explain why this organization form is often associated with persistence in excess returns.
The dilemma facing fund managers is illustrated by a widely reported incident involving hedge fund manager John Paulson, who became famous (and very wealthy) by betting against mortgagebacked securities, and one of his former investors who, backed by two investment banks, implemented a similar investment strategy. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 15, 2008:
It was the spring of 2006, and Mr. Paulson, seeking investors for a new fund, gave Mr.
Greene a peek at his plan. Mr. Greene didn't wait for the fund to open. He beat his friend to the punch by doing the same complex mortgage-market trade on his own.
The problem evident in the Paulson case, and the concerns evidenced by hedge funds for confidentiality, suggest that what investors learn from past returns is not limited to ability or talent unique to the manager, as assumed by Berk and Green (2004) for the mutual fund industry.
Neither are these concerns consistent with models of "soft information" applied to venture capital, which Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show exhibit persistence, as in Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jørgensen (2010) . Investors (and managers) may also be learning about the profitability of innovative trading strategies and this information, if known to others, would attract imitation and competition.
Our model considers this possibility in a setting similar to that of Berk and Green (2004) . As in their paper, both managers and investors learn about the profitability of the fund through past performance. Future profitability in Berk and Green (2004) depends negatively on assets under management, due to decreasing returns to scale. This is also the case in our model, but in addition the investments made by other partnerships in the same sector or using a similar trading strategy reduce profitability to incumbents going forward.
In the model, there is an infinite number of potential limited partners (LPs), whereas the number of potential general partners (GPs) is finite. In dealing with investors, the GP makes the first take-it-or-leave-it offer, consistent with the GP's abilities or skills being the ultimately scarce resource. The critical question is why high expected performance going forward should increase the outside option, or reservation price, of the LPs in deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.
To illustrate the intuition, we first fix the number of potential GPs exogenously. We later illustrate how the set of potential GPs can be determined endogenously through a fixed cost of entry.
We assume that any party with information useful in estimating future returns credibly and fully discloses it to outsiders when soliciting their participation. The reservation price of an LP being solicited by a GP is determined by the LP's ability to approach new potential GPs and disclose information about the future performance of the trading strategy with which the LP has been investing. Each such disclosure to a new GP, if expected profits are positive, adds a competitor, and thus reduces potential profits for the incumbents.
At each stage of the game, the reservation price of an LP dealing with an offer from a GP is determined by the LP's expected payoff from approaching a new GP and making him an offer. The reservation price of the new GP, responding to an offer from an LP, is determined by his ability to disclose information to, and solicit capital from, a new LP. Thus, the expanding set of competitors that results from the search for alternative partners acts like a discount factor in an alternating-offer bargaining game.
We formulate this game recursively, and solve for the expected payoffs of the various parties as functions of the number of GPs currently informed and investing using the same trading strategy or in the same sector, the number of GPs who could potentially imitate the incumbents, and the current estimated profitability. We then examine conditions under which secrecy is an equilibrium, and the incumbent LP agrees to continue as a partner in a subsequent period. Since the reservation price of the LP is increasing in the expected returns of the strategy going forward, his share of those profits will be as well. Returns to investors will persist across periods for a given hedge fund.
Our focus on the consequences of information spillovers leads us to abstract from many obviously important features of the contracting environment for hedge funds. We ignore asymmetric information and moral hazard. As a result, investment is "first-best". The form of the contract between managers and investors is irrelevant. Our intent is not to minimize the importance of these considerations, but we instead focus on returns across periods, rather than contracting over the life of a given fund. If a general partner has positive information about future performance that can be disclosed credibly to investors, why should he not raise fees to the point that investors earn a competitive expected return going forward? Our model provides a simple answer to this question.
An alternative explanation for persistence in private partnerships is offered in Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jørgensen (2010) who focus on venture capital funds. Their explanation is based on the acquisition of "soft information" about the GP's abilities by incumbent LPs, who then hold up the GP, as in models of relationship banking such as Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (2004) . The information LPs gain through experience with a GP is assumed to be costly or impossible for the GP to communicate directly to potential investors. Our model is aimed at a similar set of facts, but relies on a completely different mechanism. Both mechanisms may well be at work. Our approach, however, may better capture features of the hedge fund environment, such as concerns for confidentiality, which are at odds with a soft-information story. Absent other frictions, with soft information GPs would pre-commit to disclosure if they could do so. Instead, they appear to go to some lengths to avoid such disclosure.
The central problem studied in our paper involves bargaining when there is a valuable idea or innovation, and two parties with different skills or resources are needed to exploit the opportunity.
In this respect, our paper shares concerns with a large literature on the economics of innovation and knowledge transfer, reaching back at least to Arrow (1959) . More recent contributions closer to our model include Anton and Yao (1994) , Yao (2002), and d'Aspremont, Bhattacharya, and Gérard-Varet (2000) . All of these papers study settings where valuable knowledge is fully or partially disclosed, and the disclosure is verifiable. The difficulties presented by the market for ideas are neatly stated by Anton and Yao, "Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea." The information in our model has these characteristics. We assume full disclosure is required to engage the necessary help or resources provided by a counter party, and that once such a disclosure is made, the newly informed counter party can in turn disclose it to others to solicit their cooperation in exploiting the opportunity. The threat of increased competition determines the relative bargaining power of any two informed counter parties, acting like an endogenous discount factor in an alternating offer game. Thus, our results show that the threat of increased competition helps to facilitate the problem of selling expropriable ideas, the central concern of this literature.
We calibrate the model to unconditional moments of the cross section of hedge funds reported in Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) . We then ask if the model can reproduce the persistence in returns observed in the data, and simultaneously match the behaviors implied when the contracts between GP and LP follow a 2/20 rule, popular in the hedge fund industry. 2 We find that the model can match the observed point estimates of persistence under the theoretical sharing rule or under a 2/20 rule, but not for both. The 2/20 rule, which we apply uniformly to all partnerships, does not allow the GP's return to be quantitatively as responsive to past performance as our theory predicts. When parameterizing our model so that a 2/20 rule would generate an empirically sensible level of performance persistence, our theoretical optimal sharing rule generates a persistence in returns to LPs that is lower than the empirical estimate, but that is still economically significant (about half of it).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the setting and solves for the optimal investment policy in a given strategy or sector. Section 3 models the outside option of each agent and solves for the division of rents between the parties. In Section 4 we derive the model's predictions in terms of secrecy, returns to investors, and fund flows. The robustness of some of these predictions is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 endogenizes the number of potential general partners using a fixed cost of entry. This leads to an interplay between expected future profitability and relative bargaining power, which may produce interesting dynamics when embedded in a dynamic model of entry. Section 7 endogenizes entry in an initial period, and uses simulation to evaluate the quantitative realism of the model's predictions. The last section summarizes and concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
There are two types of risk-neutral agents in the model: potential general partners and potential limited partners. The M general partners (GPs) have access to investment opportunities, but no capital. Funds must be obtained from one of the countably infinite identical limited partners (LPs), who have capital but lack the knowledge, networks, time, or experience to independently identify and exploit profitable investment opportunities. For the moment, we take M as exogenously given, but we will later show that a fixed cost of entry can be used, with some added notational complexity, to determine this quantity endogenously. This will tie relative bargaining power to expected returns, producing a richer set of dependencies between past returns and expected performance.
The GP makes a take-it-or-leave-it partnership offer to an LP to raise investment funds. The offer is such that the GP collects the highest possible expected profit from the partnership, subject to satisfying the LP's participation constraint. In this sense, our model is similar to the classic textbook descriptions of corporate financing. The firm acts as a Stackleberg leader in its dealings with competitive financial markets, and under first-best collects the net present value of any investment opportunities, while investors simply earn competitive returns. As Berk and Green (2004) make clear, in such an environment learning should lead flows to respond to past performance, but there is no reason that performance should persist going forward.
Each investment (and its financing) lasts only one period and is continuously scalable. The ith GP invests a positive amount Q i in order to maximize expected profits. Because of diseconomies of scale, the cost of finding good investment opportunities in a given sector or following a given trading strategy increases in Q i much as in Berk and Green (2004) . In our setting, however, the costs also increase in the total funds invested in the same trading strategy or sector by all partnerships, as denoted by Q ≡ j Q j . The cost function facing GP i is C 2 Q i Q. This specification is convenient because it reduces to the quadratic cost function C 2 Q 2 i when the partnership faces no competition, and by adding up the costs incurred by all the partnerships, we obtain the quadratic cost function C 2 Q 2 . For simplicity, the competitive return is set to zero.
Most of the analysis in our model involves the dealings between an incumbent GP and LP Reinvesting in a hedge fund will produce a realized return, before accounting for the diseconomies of scale, of φ + , where φ is the expected profitability of the trading strategy, given the information accumulated through participation in previous periods, and is a regression error with E( | φ) = 0. We assume that φ will be positively correlated with past performance, as is natural if there is learning. In Berk and Green (2004) , for example, φ is the posterior expectation of a constant mean resulting from Bayesian updating. The specific form of the correlation with past performance is not important for our results. The question facing us is why expected returns to outside investors should depend positively on φ, which would imply performance persistence.
A partnership's realized profit using the trading strategy depends on this return, the size of the investment, and the costs linked to diseconomies of scale. Specifically, the partnership's realized profit is:
For a given estimate φ of the profitability of the trading strategy, each partnership i will choose to invest an amount Q i that maximizes expected profit:
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, each partnership's optimal investment will be:
and its optimal expected profit, which we denote Π(φ, N ), will be:
To have Q * (φ, N ) > 0, we need φ > 0. Otherwise, the strategy is not expected to provide any abnormal return, even on the first dollar invested. We focus at this point on φ > 0, which is the interesting case.
Equations (2)- (4) immediately give an expression for returns gross of fees generated by a partnership within a period:
.
Information Spillovers
GPs in our model are of two sorts. Incumbent GPs have experience with the trading strategy, and through this experience enter a period knowing φ. Non-incumbent, potential GPs have the general expertise to enter and compete with incumbents for the strategy's profits, but lack specific knowledge of its potential profitability.
When any informed agent solicits a potential partner, we assume he discloses, fully and credibly, his information about past returns, or equivalently, φ. We abstract from the possibility that a GP would commit fraud or mislead investors through incomplete disclosure, and assume no agent would agree to partner with someone absent full and credible disclosure. We can view the first LP approached by an incumbent GP as the investor who has partnered with the GP in the previous period, but since the GP cannot operate without disclosing φ to an LP first, it is not essential that the LP has previous experience. As we will see, it is in an incumbent GP's interest to minimize the number of informed parties, so if he has partnered with a particular LP in the past, he would approach that LP first. Consider an incumbent GP and LP with a shared knowledge of φ based on the realized returns on a past investment. This information could be fully and credibly disclosed to other, potential, GPs (in finite supply), or LPs (in infinite supply). If the incumbent LP terminates the partnership with his initial GP, the "rejected" GP will be able to solicit a new and so far uninformed LP to invest with during the next period. Similarly, the incumbent LP, with the intent of forming a new partnership, will be able to bring the expected returns available to the attention of a new GP, by disclosing the information in φ.
In the event that they are not satisfied with the profit sharing rule offered by the party they are bargaining with, these disclosures provide solicited agents with outside options. The incumbent GP and LP will nonetheless have an incentive to continue their partnership together in a subsequent period, because involving new partners in the trading strategy would increase competition and reduce the profit earned by each partnership. 4
Consider the bargaining problem between a general partner who previously invested in a trading strategy and the limited partner who provided him with capital. Both agents know φ (> 0). The general partner solicits reinvestment funds from the limited partner in the next period by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The limited partner's reservation price is determined by his opportunity to inform a non-incumbent GP of φ, and make him a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In turn, the new GP, who is now informed about the profit opportunities, can share that information with a new LP, and make him a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and so on. We assume there are a finite number, M , of potential GPs with the skill and expertise needed to implement the trading strategy, and an infinite number of potential LPs. As we will show, this implies the GPs have more bargaining power in this game, since they are supplying the resource that, ultimately, is the scarce one.
An incumbent GP, then, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to his original LP that consists of a share of the expected profits Π(φ, N ). Since the participation constraint of an agent, whether LP or GP, in a sector or trading strategy with N competing partnerships depends on the profits he could make competing with N + 1 partnerships, we need to use backward induction to solve for participation constraints.
Denote as:
V (φ, N ) Given φ, the expected payoff to a GP making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to an LP, when there are currently N active and informed GPs competing in the market.
W (φ, N ) Given φ, the expected payoff to an informed LP, if there are currently N − 1 informed GPs, and the LP reveals φ to a non-incumbent GP through a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
If there are N GPs currently informed and actively pursuing the trading strategy, then profits in a symmetric equilibrium are given by equation (4). An incumbent GP, then, with a successful offer to an LP, whether incumbent or newly informed by the GP, will earn this profit less what he offered the LP. The lowest offer that will succeed must pay the LP what he would obtain if he declined, and sought another non-incumbent GP as a partner, W (φ, N + 1). Therefore:
To obtain an expression for W (φ, N +1), consider the LP who rejects the original GP's offer and seeks a new partner. The LP informs this new, N + 1 th , GP of φ, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. This offer must be at least as large as the benefit the new GP could obtain by making an offer to a new LP, rationally anticipating that the rejected LP, who is now informed, will seek yet another GP, resulting in N + 2 competitors. The lowest successful offer then gives the LP the following expected payoff:
Substituting recursively gives us the following expressions for the expected payoffs for the LP and GP:
and
Solving the above system of difference equations requires terminal values for the expected payoff functions. Recall the total number of potential GPs is M . When there are already M GPs informed and competing, then the LPs have no outside option beyond a competitive financial return, which is assumed to be zero. They will accept any offer from a GP that pays them this expected return, so:
Suppose, then, that there are M − 1 GPs currently competing against each others. An offer made by a GP to an LP will be accepted if the LP gets more than he would making an offer to the M th GP, rationally anticipating that the rejected GP, who is informed about φ, will seek yet another LP, resulting in M competitors. But once the M th and final GP is informed he can make an offer to one of the remaining LPs, who have only the competitive outside option. Therefore:
The critical players in the system are the GPs and LPs when there are M − 2 competitors. At this point the LP has bargaining power. An LP approaching the M − 1 th GP can make an offer that will be accepted if it exceeds the profit he would earn seeking a new partner, anticipating the rejected LP will also seek a new partner, so that the M − 1 th GP will end up competing with M other GPs. Therefore:
An offer made by a GP to an LP will be accepted if the LP gets more than W (φ, M − 1).
Therefore:
which is larger than V (φ, M − 1) when φ > 0.
By iterating these steps, we can solve for the general form of the payoff functions V (φ, N ) and
and 
Model Predictions: Secrecy, Return Persistence, and Fund Flows
In this section we derive predictions from our model in terms of information secrecy, return persistence, and fund flows. We focus on the case in which φ > 0, so net positive investment in the trading strategy is optimal. To facilitate these derivations, we first present Lemma 1.
Proof: See Appendix for all proofs.
We now establish that each agent who can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at any point will act in equilibrium to avoid the information spillovers that would result from soliciting outside potential partners. For "secrecy" to be an equilibrium, we must show both parties obtain higher expected payoffs with less competition. The next proposition accomplishes this.
Proposition 1
The payoff functions, V (φ, N ) and W (φ, N ), are weakly decreasing in N , and are strictly decreasing in N for N < M .
This result implies that an agent making a take-it-or-leave-it offer will always find it optimal to satisfy his initial partner's participation constraint, keeping the estimated profitability of the trading strategy as secret as possible. The benefits from keeping the competition to a minimum outweigh any gains from reducing the solicited partner's bargaining power by increasing the number of informed agents. That is, secrecy is an equilibrium.
Consequently, the first offer an incumbent GP makes to his initial LP will be good enough to ensure that it is accepted. An incumbent LP will therefore expect to receive from reinvesting in the fund a payoff of:
Expected returns to LPs are then straightforward to calculate. The LP contributes capital Q * (φ, N ) and received an expected payoff of W (φ, N +1). From equations (3) and (17), the per dollar expected return is:
Proposition 2 This result establishes that the outside option for an LP is positive and increasing in φ. Any successful offer by an incumbent GP to an LP, whether new or incumbent, will pay positive expected profits that are increasing in estimated future profitability. Thus, as long as expected profitability increases with past returns, we have established that expected returns to LPs will show persistence across periods.
In our model, fund flows will follow performance, as long as expected future profitability φ increases with past returns.
1. increase in estimated future profitability φ 2. increase in the degree of competition N , and 3. are more responsive to estimated profitability when there is more competition.
Flows respond to higher expected profitability for the same reasons they do in Berk and Green (2004) . While marginal costs rise with fund size, and with aggregate industry flows, the higher expected returns compensate investors for these increased costs.
Increased competition leads partnerships to invest more aggressively because with more competitors, each fund internalizes less of their impact on aggregate flows, and the resulting increase in costs. By the same logic, the model predicts that flows are more responsive to performance the more competitive the sector.
The set of possible partners for a GP in our model is unlimited, while the number of potential partners for an LP is finite. As a result, the GPs in our model always have more bargaining power and command a greater share of the profits. They are in relatively scarce supply. The following result formalizes the intuitive link between this relative scarcity and the share of value accruing to both partners. Recall that V (φ, N ) is the expected payoff to a GP, with N active incumbents, while W (φ, N +1) is the expected profit that accrues to an LP. When there are M active partnerships, the LP's only outside options is a competitive return of zero, so the difference between his payoff and that of the GP is the value of the partnership. The proof of the proposition shows by a recursive argument that this difference is a lower bound for the difference between the expected profits to the GP and LP for any N . The impact of increased competition on the relative bargaining power of the GP and the LP is more complex. In Figure 1 we plot the share of total profits accruing to the GP, N ) , and the LP, N ) . Evidently, these are not monotonic in the degree of competition. The LP's relative bargaining power is tied both to the number of potential GPs available, and to the extent to which profits dissipate with additional competition. These quantities are changing at different rates, creating the non-monotonic relationship evident in the figure. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the degree of competition, N , the expected return to the partnership as a whole, and the expected return to the LP. The expected return to the LP decreases monotonically. As N increases, the expected payoff to the LP decreases. The capital invested also falls, but not by enough since the partnership fails to internalize the impact on aggregate profits, and this problem becomes more severe with more competitors.
The model also suggests that future performance increases with fund size and is lower for firsttime funds. From Proposition 2 we know that the expected return to the LPs is positive and increasing in φ. From equation 3 we know the same is true of Q * (φ, N ). Therefore, fixing N and M -that is, controlling for the bargaining power of the LPs-return and size will be positively associated in the cross section. Variations in Q * will help predict the expected profit the LP will collect from reinvesting in the fund.
The logic behind the model also suggests expected returns to LPs should be lower for first-time funds. The GP in the model makes the first take-it-or-leave-it offer. In the absence of information spillovers the LP would earn a competitive return of zero. When reinvesting, the LP expects to collect W (φ, N +1) if φ > 0 and zero otherwise. Accordingly, in the initial investment the GP could, in principle, offer the LP a negative expected profit equal to −E [W (φ, N + 1) · I(φ > 0)] and the LP's ex-ante participation constraint would bind. The expected profit from the initial investment will therefore be smaller than the expected profit from the subsequent investment. Evidently, this relationship also holds for expected returns, given the signs of each term. It seems unlikely, of course, that LPs will enter partnerships without some disclosure of proprietary information to them, but as long as more information accrues to them through experience in the sector or with the strategies pursued by the GP, we would expect the LP's bargaining power to increase over time.
So far, we have kept our model as frictionless as possible in order to maximize its tractability and transparency. For example, our model is a game of disclosure, where all information is costlessly and credibly communicated from incumbent partners to outsiders when they decide to disclose. This allows us to abstract from the complications of a bargaining game under asymmetric information, where offers from incumbents would signal private information. We now briefly consider the robustness of the model's implications with respect to variations in the assumptions.
Three central elements are at work in our model:
1. In the cross section of funds, potential expected returns going forward must be correlated with past returns. This plays the same role in our model as in Berk and Green (2004) .
2. The capacity to generate excess returns must be something the incumbent LP can, to some extent, take with him on defecting from an existing partnership. This, along with the first item above, ensures the LP's outside option increases in past returns.
3. There must be frictional costs of some sort that dissipate rents when the LP defects. These costs ensure secrecy is an equilibrium.
The simplifying assumptions in our model serve to make the interaction between these three elements particularly stark. The LP is assumed to be able to fully communicate information acquired through past participation and thus completely replicate with an outside GP whatever he could achieve with the incumbent GP (item 2). None of the ability to create expected returns is specific to the manager. The only cost to going to an outsider is increased competition (item 3). This cost acts like an endogenously determined, non-constant discount factor in a repeated offer game, steadily diminishing the shared surplus as the set of informed parties grows.
If we were to allow for noisy transmission of information to outsiders, asymmetric information in dealing with outsiders, or additional skills unique to the incumbent GP, it would certainly complicate the model. It does not, however, appear likely to reverse or overturn the model's implications, as long as the three elements described above are still present, as they seem likely to be in the institutional setting under consideration. Since the GP is making the first take-it-orleave-it offer, different assumptions about the profits, their origins, or their transferability are likely to affect the expected surplus the GP is collecting, but not the predictions that secrecy is valuable or that incumbent LPs collect rents that increase with past returns.
Endogenous Entry at Intermediate Dates
The analysis to this point takes the number of potential GPs as fixed and finite, which imparts a bargaining advantage to them in their dealings with LPs. In this section we illustrate how the set of potential GPs at the intermediate date can be endogenously determined through a fixed cost of entry. As the number of competing GPs increases, per-partnership profits fall. If there is a fixed cost for non-incumbent GPs to enter, this will limit the set of potential, non-incumbent GPs. That limit will, in turn, reflect the expected profitability of the trading strategy or sector, φ, leading to a dependence between past returns and the relative bargaining power of the two parties.
Nevertheless, the functions describing the division of rents between the GP and the LP retain the same form, with a few notational complications.
Suppose that non-incumbent GPs face a fixed cost of k upon implementing the trading strategy or entering the sector. The timing of events is as follows. First, the new GP receives information about φ from an LP, along with an offered sharing rule. Next, the GP makes the entry decision, and either incurs the fixed cost k or walks away and receives a payoff of zero. Third, the GP can reject the offer from the initial LP, and solicit financing from a new LP while disclosing φ. Thus, the entry cost is naturally interpreted as effort or expenditure required for a new GP to reach a point where he can effectively solicit funding and implement the trading strategy in question.
Once the entry cost is paid, symmetric equilibria determining profits and investment in the industry are the same as before. If there are N − 1 informed GPs competing for profits, then upon learning the value of φ a new GP will enter only if:
The maximum number of potential entrants is given by the M * (φ) that exhausts the profitability of the industry. Thus, M * (φ) is the maximum integer M such that:
or equivalently, such that:
Now suppose an informed GP makes an offer to his former LP when there are N informed GPs targeting the same trading strategy or sector. The GP will have to offer the LP at least W (φ, N +1) and will make:
If the LP rejects the offer, he knows that the informed GP has already paid the entry cost, hence will enter as long as φ > 0. The LP will have to make an offer to an uninformed GP of at least V (φ, N + 2) − k, the new GP's expected payoff if he were to reject the offer. Thus:
In order for the LP to have an outside option, he needs to ensure that entering the sector or implementing a trading strategy with an uninformed GP, given that the GP who made him the earlier offer will also compete, promises positive expected profits, that is:
At M * (φ), the maximum number of partnerships that keeps the sector or trading strategy profitable, the informed LP will not be able to convince an uninformed GP to enter a partnership with him because the M * (φ) + 1 th partnership will not be profitable. Therefore:
An informed GP at M * (φ) is sure that no uninformed GP will ever pay k to enter the sector, hence the informed GP has all the bargaining power at M * (φ). Thus:
which is greater or equal to k, by definition of M * (φ).
Similarly, if an informed LP was to reject a GP offer at M * (φ)−1 and make an offer to a M * (φ) th GP, this previously uninformed GP would know that by rejecting the LP's offer, the rejected LP would be unable to find a M * (φ) + 1 th GP. Hence:
By recursion, we can find the exact same value functions V (·, ·) and W (·, ·) as in our model with M , except that V (·, ·) represents the payoff to an incumbent GP and V (·, ·) − k represents the payoff to a non-incumbent GP. 
Endogenous Entry at Initial Date with a Calibrated Example
This section describes how we can endogenize entry at an initial date, before any learning has occurred, and through simulation generate a cross section of partnership returns with which to examine the quantitative properties of the model.
There are two periods, and three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. The entry cost at the beginning of the initial period is k 0 , which we assume to be greater than the entry cost at the intermediate date, k 1 . When entering at the intermediate date, the GP has been informed by the LP about the profitability of the trading strategy or sector. The fact that the LP has already invested, through a competing GP, in the trading strategy or sector makes the subsequent entry with a non-incumbent GP less costly or difficult.
The return to the trading strategy from t = 0 to t = 1 (on the first dollar invested) is r 1 = ρ+ 1 , where 1 is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ 2 . The expected return ρ is unkown to both managers and investors, who have shared priors that it is normally distributed with mean φ 0 and variance η 2 . The information set of investors at the initial date is the number of partnerships using the trading strategy. Incumbent partners observe their payoffs over the initial period, and since strategies are common knowledge they can infer r 1 . They then update as Bayesians to estimate the expected profitability going forward as:
Given this estimate of potential profitability, we can calculate the number of GPs who, if informed, would enter the sector or implement the trading strategy at the intermediate date. This is M * (φ 1 ), the maximum integer such that:
Given the estimated profitability φ 0 , which is known by every agent, the number of partnerships N * (φ 0 ) to enter in the first period will be the maximum integer N such that:
Notice that if φ 1 is sufficiently small compared to φ 0 , then M * (φ 1 ) ≤ N * (φ 0 ) and the LP has no bargaining power at the intermediate date. How small φ 1 has to be for that situation to occur depends on how the cost of entry at the intermediate date, k 1 , compares with the cost of entry at the initial date, k 0 . We would expect k 0 , the entry cost in the first period, without special information about the sector or trading strategy, to be greater than k 1 , the entry cost with the information shared by an incumbent LP.
The second term in the equilibrium entry condition, (21), is the expectation of a nonlinear function of φ 1 , and does not admit a closed-form solution. It is however straightforward to calculate numerically, which allows us to solve numerically for N * (φ 0 ). We can then simulate two periods of returns for a large cross section of artificial funds, and in this way evaluate the model's ability to quantitatively capture salient empirical facts about hedge fund investing.
We simulate a cross section of 20,000 hedge fund partnerships. Each partnership invests in a trading strategy or sector for one period, learns about its profitability, and then decides whether to reinvest for the next period. Each simulated partnership is a representative of its own trading strategy or sector. All funds are identical initially, and therefore operate with the same number (N * (φ 0 ) − 1) of competitors. First-period returns are drawn independently, expectations are updated, M * (φ 1 ) is determined for each fund, and the expected profits are split according to the bargaining model between the LP and GP. We then draw returns again to determine realized profits for those partnerships that survived and were sufficiently profitable to continue.
The artificial cross section of all first-period funds and the surviving second-period funds is used to compare the simulated outcomes to moments from Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) . We set parameter values to approximate unconditional moments from these papers. To evaluate the model, we then ask how well it captures the facts regarding fund returns across investment periods.
Our model predicts how expected profits are shared between GPs and LPs, but the sharing contract in terms of realized profits is indeterminate. In the data, a particular contract predominates (see Fung and Hsieh 1999) . Under the so-called "2/20 rule" GPs charge investors an annual management fee of 2 percent of assets under management and a carried interest of 20 percent of profits. One question we ask, therefore, is how close applying a 2/20 contract to all funds comes to implementing the optimal solutions from our model in the simulated data. That is, does the division of surplus using this specific contract approximate, both unconditionally and conditional on previous returns, the division of surplus implied by our model?
To estimate the performance persistence of a hedge fund, Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) regress its risk-adjusted return from a three-year period over that from the preceding (nonoverlapping) three-year period. We therefore normalize each period in our model as a three-year period. As our benchmark fee structure for each period, we use a "6/20" rule, which is basically a "2/20" rule, but accumulated for three years.
The parameter values used in our simulations are presented in the table below. Keep in mind that the measure of expected profitability φ 0 applies only to the first dollar invested. Average realized profitability will be much lower. Assuming normally distributed excess returns simplifies the learning mechanism in our simulation. It has the disadvantages of producing excess returns that are smaller than −100% with positive probability. Keep in mind, however, that this applies to realized excess returns. The frequency with which limited liability would be violated would be much lower for realized total return, though of course it is still possible. The probability of this event would decrease if we were to choose lower values for η and σ, but this would also decrease the probability of partnerships being dissolved at the intermediate date. We use a relatively low value for the idiosyncratic noise in order to have cross-sectional differences in funds that are mostly driven by differences in expected profitability.
The parameter values were chosen through trial and error to approximate several unconditional moments of the cross section. We interpret the unconditional cross section as the pooled set of investments.
When we average over the full cross section, the average fund size is $206M, in line with the subsample averages reported in Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) (between $170M and $255M). The survival rate from one three-year period to the next is 17.9% in our cross section, slightly higher than the 12% average rate that Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) report.
In our simulated pooled cross section of funds, the average partnership-wide return (i.e., grossof-fee abnormal return) is 2.35% per year. Our parameterization does a good job ensuring that the 2/20 rule and the model's predicted profit-sharing rule yield similar unconditional moments. find that performance persistence is concentrated among better performing hedge funds. Figure 6 plots the relationship our model predicts between returns earned from the first threeyear period and expected returns to be collected by incumbent LPs in the second three-year period.
The figure also plots the returns each simulated LP would collect, on average, if it were facing a 2/20 compensation scheme instead (using, for each simulated initial three-year period, 20,000 simulated three-year scenarios). Similarly, Figure 7 compares the expected revenue per dollar of assets under management an incumbent GP would collect based on our model and on a 2/20 rule. These figures suggest that, under the current parameterization, our model's optimal contract generates more cross-sectional variation in the expected share of the profits going to the GPs than does a uniformly applied 2/20 rule. Since the GP and LP share the total expected payoff, this in turn dampens the variation in the returns going to the LPs. A way to quantify these cross-sectional variations is through the use of cross-sectional regressions. For example, in our simulated sample of partnerships, regressing a partnership's second-period return to LPs from a 2/20 rule over its first-period returns to LPs and a constant yields a coefficient of 0.24, in line with the coefficients reported by Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) (i.e., between 0.22 and 0.30) . Running the same regression, but using second-period returns predicted by our model rather than by a 2/20 rule, yields a coefficient of 0.11, almost half the persistence we get with the 2/20 rule.
To summarize these findings, at parameters chosen to match the unconditional moments of the pooled cross section, such as average fund size and survival probability, we can ensure the right level of persistence for the uniformly applied 2/20 contract. Our model, while producing significant levels of performance persistence, is unable to match the empirically observed level of persistence. Thus, relative to our model, performance is more persistent for actual funds because, either flows in the data are less responsive than in the model or because the 2/20 contract, when applied uniformly to all partnerships, is too rigid for the GP's share to fully respond to information about future profits, or both.
There are two ways to increase the persistence in the returns to LPs in our model. First, by limiting the number of initial entrants, one can decrease the responsiveness of flows to performance.
A monopoly, for example, would reinvest less aggressively than a duopoly. Proceeding in this direction, however, also increases the persistence in returns based on the 2/20 rule. Alternatively, we can manipulate the parameters that control how returns are split between the LP and GP, to
give the LP more bargaining power at the intermediate date. The difficulty here is that increasing the LP's share of the second-period profits, as it reduces the GP's expected profit, must be offset with lower average profits for the LP in the first three-year period. This pushes the average return to the LP in the first three-year period below the levels from the 2/20 rule.
So, while our model could match the observed point estimates, the 2/20 returns under such a parameterization would overstate them. In practice, especially successful managers often increase their carry and fees after good returns. Thus, it may be that our oversimplified implementation of the 2/20 rule, which ignores many of the variations in actual contract terms, overstates the rigidity in the GP's share across periods.
Finally, from Figure 6 it is evident that some funds in our sample would not survive if a 2/20 rule was implemented. Second-period funds with relatively small, but positive φ would be profitable according to our model, but rational and informed LPs would refuse to finance such investments in a 2/20 environment. The fixed fee of two percent per year would end up exhausting more than the expected returns available, and LPs would expect to lose money on their investment. For this reason, we compare the persistence coefficients generated by our model and by a 2/20 rule when only considering funds that would survive given both profit sharing schemes. For these funds, our model generates a level of performance persistence of 0.14 whereas the 2/20 rule generates a coefficient of 0.15. That is, considering funds that are simultaneously viable for LPs in a 2/20 rule and in our model significantly reduces the difference in the implications between our model and a 2/20 rule. This, in turn, allows the calibrated model to more closely match observed outcomes of persistence without pushing the persistence under the 2/20 rule to implausible levels.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a simple model of hedge funds. Its central features are based on evident differences in the institutional setting between mutual funds and hedge funds. In contrast to the model for mutual funds in Berk and Green (2004) , the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with a new trading strategy or an emerging sector, rather than just with ability specific to the manager. This leads to performance persistence because incumbent investors benefit, along with managers, from increases in the estimated profitability of a given investment associated with high realized returns. Sharing information rents with initial investors guarantees incumbent managers that their investors will not leave them at an intermediate date to form partnerships with nonincumbent managers, resulting in information spillovers and competition that dissipates profits.
While the model clearly oversimplifies many features of the environment, when calibrated to the empirical moments from past studies, it captures quantitatively many important aspects of the observed outcomes. However, returns to LPs show less persistence in our model than in the data.
The source of this discrepancy appears to be the rigidity of a uniformly applied 2/20 contract, as the model predicts more variation in GP returns due to past performance than can be achieved through the 2/20 sharing rule.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: First, consider F (N, N + K) when K is even. We can rewrite F (N, N + K)
For any j ∈ N ++ , the term [f (N + 2j − 1) − f (N + 2j)] is strictly positive because f (N +2j −1) > f (N + 2j). Hence, for any T ∈ N ++ F (N, N + 2 · T ) is a sum of strictly positive number and is also strictly positive.
It remains to consider F (N, N + K) when K is odd. We can write:
Since K +1 is even, the last term is positive, and the first term is positive by the above argument for K even. Hence, for any combination of N ≥ 1 and K ≥ 1, F (N, N + K) will be strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 1: For N > M − 2 the result is self-evident from the expressions for the terminal values in equations (11)-(15). When N ≤ M − 2, we must separately consider the cases when M − N is even and odd.
When M − N is odd, and M − N ≥ 2, we must establish the following inequalities hold:
We first show that the inequality in (A-4) is equivalent to (A-3). Subtracting the final term from the left-hand side of (A-4) we obtain:
which is identical to the left-hand side of (A-3). Subtracting the same expression from the righthand side of (A-4) gives: Since Q is linear in φ, however, this result will hold if H (N ) > 0, which was just established.
Proof of Proposition 4: From equations (6) and (7), evaluated at N rather than N + 1, we have: 
